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The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering
Civil Public Debate
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VIKRAM D. AMAR
Partisanship can make policy discussion and civil debate difficult. Partisan
differences in how facts and policies are understood contribute to the escalation of
conflict and a lack of cooperation. Lawyers are not immune from these human
tendencies. But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, values,
knowledge, and skills that can aid in fostering and modeling more productive
debate and resolution of conflict.
Lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and safeguard the
foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy, to uphold the law even when
it does not reflect their own individual preferences. The professional rules of
conduct encourage lawyers to separate the professional from the personal, and
expect that vigorous debate, dissent, and zealous advocacy will be done in a
professional manner. Lawyers are taught to think about issues, cases, or
arguments from multiple sides and to value rational argument, the primacy of
evidence and facts, and neutral processes in which cases are decided on their
merits. The nuanced approaches to conflict that are required of lawyers—
distinguishing productive and unproductive conflict, both creating and claiming
value, and acting as both advisors and advocates—equip lawyers with abilities
that help them generate and manage more productive debate.
Law schools, then, should strive to provide even better grounding in these
values, knowledge, and skills. Lawyers should endeavor to highlight for
themselves, their clients and colleagues, and their opponents nuanced approaches
to conflict and debate. And law schools and lawyers should work to educate the
broader citizenry about the values of our constitutional democracy and to model
effective and civil dispute resolution strategies.

1093

The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering
Civil Public Debate
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT * & VIKRAM D. AMAR **
We are in a time in which political polarization is frequently in the
headlines,1 public opinion polls reveal a pervasive sense of division2 and a
sense that political discussions have become less grounded in facts,3 and
many are concerned about the civility (or lack thereof) with which we treat
each other across political differences.4 Partisanship can, indeed, make
policy discussion and civil debate difficult. And there are many aspects of
human psychology that can contribute to the hurdles. Take a prominent
example: people interpret policies and information differently depending
*
Alice Curtis Campbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois College
of Law. Our thanks go to Jean Sternlight for her very helpful comments and suggestions.
**
Dean, Iwan Foundation Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1
See, e.g., Jaclyn Gallucci, When It Comes to Politics, Americans Are Divided. Can Data Change
That?, FORTUNE (July 17, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/07/17/political-polarization-inamerica-define/ (discussing “polarization unity” and how polarized voters and campaign donor
influence furthers political division); Natalie Pattillo, As Shutdown Pauses, Coverage Focuses on
Partisan Polarization, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/politics/
shutdown-partisan-coverage.php (describing focus of news coverage on polarization). See also Shanto
Iyengar et al., The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States, 22 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 129, 130–31 (2019) (describing affective polarization and how to mitigate it); Samara
Klar et al., Opinion, Is America Hopelessly Polarized, or Just Allergic to Politics?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/opinion/polarization-politics-democratsrepublicans.html (suggesting that we are less polarized than we think). See generally JOSHUA GREENE,
MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM 5, 14–16 (2014)
(describing “us v. them” conflicts and the role they play in moral decision making); JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION, at xi–xii (2012)
(describing how a “righteous” mind enables both cooperation and moralistic conflict).
2
See, e.g., ROBERT P. JONES & MAXINE NAJLE, PRRI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: THE
FATE OF PLURALISM IN A DIVIDED NATION 28 (2019), https://www.prri.org/research/americandemocracy-in-crisis-the-fate-of-pluralism-in-a-divided-nation/ (finding that “Americans are nearly
unanimous in their belief that the country is divided over politics (91%), with 74% of Americans saying
that the country is very divided”).
3
Most Americans Say Political Debate in the U.S. Has Become Less Respectful, Fact-Based,
Substantive, PEW RES. CTR. (July 18, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/18/
americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-grown-more-toxic-and-heated-rhetoric-could-lead-toviolence/ft_19-07-18_toxicpolitics_most-americans-say-political-debate-us-less-respectful-fact-basedsubstantive/ (finding that 76% of American adults believe political debate has grown less fact-based in
recent years).
4
WEBER SHANDWICK, POWELL TATE & KRC RESEARCH, CIVILITY IN AMERICA 2019:
SOLUTIONS FOR TOMORROW 2, 8–9, 10–15 (2019), https://www.webershandwick.com/news/civility-inamerica-2019-solutions-for-tomorrow/.
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5

on their perspective and preferences, and assess evidence in accordance
with preferences and prior beliefs.6 And recent research has found that
people’s ideological beliefs can even make it difficult to evaluate the basic
logical validity of arguments.7
Despite these tendencies, we tend to believe that our own perceptions
and experiences are objective and accurate, and often fail to realize the
ways that our perceptions are influenced by our own perspective,
knowledge, expectations, and desires—a phenomenon known as naïve
realism.8 This naïve realism creates the “feeling that [our] own take on the
world enjoys particular authenticity, and that other actors will, or at least
should, share that take, if they are attentive, rational, and objective
perceivers of reality and open-minded seekers of truth.”9 This feeling tends
to make us confident that we should be able to persuade others of the
rightness of our positions.10 But when others persist in having different
views, it can lead us to conclude that they are unreasonable, biased, or

5

See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 132–34 (1954) (finding partisan interpretations by the fans of
opposing sports teams); Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 854–55, 883–85 (2012) (finding that preferences
and prior beliefs influenced interpretations of videotape of a political demonstration); David
Tannenbaum et al., On the Misplaced Politics of Behavioural Policy Interventions, 1 NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 5 (2017) (finding that people find behavioral interventions more ethical when the nature of
the intervention matches their political beliefs and less ethical when it does not); Leaf Van Boven et al.,
Psychological Barriers to Bipartisan Public Support for Climate Policy, 13 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI.
492, 493, 496–500 (2018) (describing how partisans devalue policy proposals from an opposing party).
6
Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2108
(1979); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 197 (1998).
7
Anup Gampa et al., (Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning, 10 SOC.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1075, 1082 (2019). See generally Peter H. Ditto et al., At Least Bias Is
Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives, 14 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 273 (2019) (reporting a meta-analysis of the tendency “to evaluate otherwise identical
information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs and allegiances”).
8
Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 646 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
9
Id. Naïve realism also leads to the belief that we make more accurate assessments of other
people than they make of us. This is the illusion of asymmetric insight. “We insist that our ‘outsider
perspective’ affords us insights about our peers that they are denied by their defensiveness,
egocentricity, or other sources of bias. By contrast, we rarely entertain the notion that others are seeing
us more clearly and objectively than we see ourselves.” Emily Pronin et al., You Don’t Know Me, But I
Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 639, 639 (2001).
This can mean that we are prone to “talk when we would do well to listen and to be less patient than we
ought to be when others express the conviction that they are the ones who are being misunderstood or
judged unfairly.” Id. at 652–53.
10
Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict
and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 116 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
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ill-motived. Research has found that people commonly conclude that
those who disagree with them are biased, simply because they disagree.12
Once a person attributes bias to another, they tend to see their conflict as
more pervasive, to expect cooperation to be less worthwhile, and to act
more competitively. Not surprisingly, this tends to cause the other person
to respond in kind, creating a spiral of conflict.13 And incivility makes
arguments seem less sound,14 likely contributing to the escalation of
conflict.
When differences in perspective are particularly focal—e.g., two
people are on different sides of a contentious issue—we tend to
overestimate those differences.15 Similarly, we tend to overestimate the
degree to which things like ideology and self-interest influence other
people’s views and behavior, believing that others are more motivated or
influenced by these than we are ourselves.16 One study asked people with
varying views on an issue to express their own judgments and also to
predict how their understandings would differ from those with other
political views.17 While there were, in fact, differences in how people with
different political views perceived the case, these differences were
relatively small compared to the large differences predicted by the
participants.18 These sorts of mispredictions can mean that people are
overly doubtful and cynical about the potential fruits of collaboration or
finding common ground.19
11

Id. at 111; Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004); Leigh Thompson & George
Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176, 193 (1992).
12
Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and
the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008).
13
Id.
14
Jason R. Popan et al., Testing the Effects of Incivility During Internet Political Discussion on
Perceptions of Rational Argument and Evaluations of a Political Outgroup, 96 COMPUTERS HUM.
BEHAV. 123, 130 (2019).
15
Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Perspective Taking: Misstepping into Others’ Shoes, in
HANDBOOK OF IMAGINATION AND MENTAL SIMULATION 297, 304 (Keith D. Markman et al. eds.,
2009).
16
Chip Heath, On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of Motivation
Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 25,
26 (1999); Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM . PSYCHOL. 1053, 1053 (1999); Rebecca K.
Ratner & Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest and Its Effects on Social Action, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14 (2001); see also Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, “Naive Cynicism” in
Everyday Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 751 (1999) (finding that “people have cynical intuitions about how others assess
responsibility”).
17
Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in
Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414 (1995).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 416.
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Lawyers, of course, are not immune from these human tendencies. The
adversarial nature of our legal system and the representative nature of legal
practice means that lawyers must necessarily operate much of the time
with a partisan perspective.20 This partisan lens can contribute to the sorts
of spirals just described.21 And incivility in the profession has been a topic
of concern.22
But good lawyers have, and good law schools teach, a range of values,
knowledge, and skills that should be useful in fostering and modeling more
productive debate and resolution of conflict.23
Importantly, lawyers are trained and socialized to internalize and
safeguard the foundational tenets of our constitutional democracy.24 The
rule of law in the United States—and the prospect over time of formulating
better policy that itself will be respected as legitimate—depends on notice
and opportunity to be heard, the robust exercise of freedom of speech and a
free press, substantive engagement of ideas, and confidence that dissenting
viewpoints are engaged on their merits rather than merely overridden or
20

See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150–51 (1993) (finding that representation of a party on one side
of a legal case influences perceptions of fairness). See also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838,
887, 896–97 (2009) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize how different people might
interpret a video of a police chase in Scott v. Harris).
21
See, e.g., Stephen M. Garcia et al., Morally Questionable Tactics: Negotiations Between
District Attorneys and Public Defenders, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 731, 737 (2001)
(finding that attorneys viewed questionable negotiation tactics as more appropriate when used in
response to the perceived use of questionable tactics by the other side).
22
See NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L & RESEARCH ETHICS, SURVEY ON PROFESSIONALISM: A STUDY
OF ILLINOIS LAWYERS 2014, at 5 (2014), https://www.2civility.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Studyof-Illinois-Lawyers-2014.pdf (noting that more than eighty-five percent of lawyers surveyed reported
experience with some kind of uncivil behavior in the past six months, such as sarcasm, condescension,
misrepresentation, or negotiating in bad faith); LAUREN STILLER RIKLEEN, RIKLEEN INST. FOR
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP, SURVEY OF WORKPLACE CONDUCT AND BEHAVIORS IN LAW FIRMS 33, 38
(2018), https://wbawbf.org/sites/WBAR-PR1/files/WBA%20Survey%20of%20Workplace%20Conduct
%20and%20Behaviors%20in%20Law%20Firms%20FINAL.pdf (describing inappropriate behavior at
law firms); Sam Skolnik, More Than Third of Female Lawyers Harassed at Work, Survey Shows,
BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/more-than-third-of-femalelawyers-harassed-at-work-survey-shows (reporting that more than a third of female lawyers have been
sexually harassed at work).
23
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 349–51 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers, as neutral advocates, are well-suited to assist in
democratic discourse).
24
Interestingly, the President of the American Bar Association and the President of the
Association of American Law Schools both recently highlighted the importance of lawyers and legal
education in upholding and educating the public about the rule of law and the “pillars” of constitutional
democracy. Judy Perry Martinez, President’s Letter: Promise to a Nation, A.B.A. J., Sept.–Oct. 2019,
at 6; Vicki Jackson, President, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., 2019 Presidential Address at the Second
Meeting of the AALS House of Representatives: Pillars of Democracy: Law, Representation, and
Knowledge (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.aals.org/about/publications/newsletters/winter-2019/pillars-ofdemocracy/.
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25

ignored. Lawyers are the cultural custodians of this distinctive
government by the people, for the people, and of the people.26 When we
say—as we often do—that we are a nation of laws, not people,27 what we
mean is that our highest obedience is to a set of principles of governance,
not to the particular people who govern. This is why no person is above (or
below) the law, and why lawyers are required and trained to uphold the
law, even when it does not reflect their own individual preferences.28 That
does not, of course, mean that lawyers passively accept laws that they
believe to be unjust. Indeed, a big part of a lawyer’s role is to work for
legal reform29 through the mechanisms of our constitutional democracy.
That is why lawyers are permitted to take positions that are not supported
by existing law, provided they are, in the words of one important ethics
formulation, “warranted . . . by a nonfrivolous argument for the
exten[sion], modif[ication], or revers[al of] existing law[,] or for [the]
establish[ment] of new law.”30
In serving as institutional and cultural custodians, lawyers are required
to assume particular roles. It is for this reason that professional rules of
conduct encourage—and successful law schools teach—lawyers to
separate the professional from the personal.31 Vigorous debate, dissent, and
zealous advocacy are all valued—and can all be done in a professional
manner. As Shakespeare once said: “[D]o as adversaries do in law, strive
25

Overview – Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/
educational-activities/overview-rule-law (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
26
Former Solicitor General: Government Lawyers Critical to Rule of Law in Troubling Times,
A.B.A. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
2018/10/former-solicitor-general--government-lawyers-critical-to-rule-of/.
27
David Davenport, A Nation of Laws, Not Men, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Sept. 2, 2013),
https://www.hoover.org/research/nation-laws-not-men.
28
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating the lawyer must
abide by a client’s decision and that representation of a client does not mean the lawyer endorses the
client’s political or moral views).
29
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “[a]s a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work
to strengthen legal education.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
30
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
31
See, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L COURTESY no. 10 (KY. BAR ASS’N), https://www.kybar.org/
page/procourtesy (“A lawyer should recognize that the conflicts within a legal matter are professional
and not personal and should endeavor to maintain a friendly and professional relationship with other
attorneys in the matter. In other words, ‘leave the matter in the courtroom.’”); OBA STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM r. 2.7 (OKLA. BAR ASS’N 2006), https://www.okbar.org/ec/standardsof
professionalism/ (“We understand, and will impress upon our client, that reasonable people can
disagree without being disagreeable; and that effective representation does not require, and in fact is
impaired by, conduct which objectively can be characterized as uncivil, rude, abrasive, abusive, vulgar,
antagonistic, obstructive or obnoxious.”). For a content analysis of state bar civility codes, see Donald
E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of
Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 107–28 (2011).
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mightily, but eat and drink as friends.” In addition to the rules and norms
of professionalism, lawyers also have their own interests in treating those
on the opposing side of a particular issue, case, or dispute with respect.
Lawyers are repeat-players and are likely to encounter each other in future
cases. Reputation—for ethicality, competence, problem-solving ability, or
civility —is an important asset that should not be squandered.33 Moreover,
someone who is on the opposing side in this case may be a partner or
collaborator in the next.
Lawyers are trained to think about issues, cases, or arguments from
multiple sides.34 Lawyers cannot make good predictions if they have not
thought about an issue in a complex, and multifaceted way. And lawyers
would not be able to act as good advocates if they hadn’t at least
anticipated the counterarguments. As a profession, moreover, we value
principled analysis and rational argument, rather than foregone
conclusions.35 Our system is grounded in the primacy of evidence and
facts36 and the value of neutral processes in which cases are decided on
their merits.37
32

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 1, sc. 2, ll. 281–82 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1921) (1594).
33
See, e.g., Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive
Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 621, 640 (2002) (finding that
negotiator reputation influenced negotiator behavior). See also Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational
Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28
NEGOT. J. 117, 120 (2012) (“Perhaps paradoxically, the negotiators who are most likely to have a
reputation for effectiveness are those who acknowledge that legal negotiation is just as much about the
other people who are involved and abiding by relevant professional norms as it is about the task of
competing for a favorable share of apparently scarce resources.”). See Catherine H. Tinsley et al.,
Reputation in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 255, 256–58 (Chris Honeyman &
Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017) (noting that a lawyer with an integrative reputation is perceived
to be more effective by her negotiation counterpart).
34
Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment,
47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239–41 (1984) (exploring the effects of considering
alternative outcomes); David McCraw, Think Like a Libel Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/opinion/sunday/think-like-a-libel-lawyer.html. See also Russell
Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 281, 296 (2006) (suggesting the utility of taking the perspective of a disagreeable
adjudicator).
35
Vikram David Amar, The Helpful Role Lawyers Can Play in Rebuilding American Democracy,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jan. 12, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/01/12/helpful-role-lawyers-can-playrebuilding-american-democracy (“Lawyers apply logic—and not preconceived notions or forgone
conclusions—to the facts. Logic must be tempered by history and experience but at base relies on
principled reasoning.”).
36
Id. (“Lawyers deal in facts, grounded in evidence—they don’t trade in speculation, and
certainly they do not create or promote fabricated falsehood.”). See also McCraw, supra note 34
(discussing the importance of facts to libel lawyers).
37
See, e.g., Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748 (2003)
(describing the importance of neutrality to procedural justice).

2021]

ROLE OF LAWYERS AND LAW SCHOOLS

1101

Conflict resolution skills—often taught in dispute resolution courses or
clinics—are also an important part of the lawyer’s toolkit.38 Lawyers are
routinely called upon to assist parties on opposite sides of a deal, case, or
issue to come to mutual agreement. Listening actively, with curiosity, and
for understanding—and listening with respect even in disagreement—helps
lawyers understand the interests of the parties.39 Lawyers can help bring
clients along to agreement by counseling them to assess both their own
interests and those of the other side.40 Lawyers rely on empathy and
creativity to craft or frame proposals that will satisfy the interests of both
sides.41 Lawyers know that differences in interests or values make it
possible to create value through exchange.42
Of course, any serious and productive attempt to better align law
school curricula and culture with modes of argumentation that might better
serve individual law school graduates and society must reckon with the
reality that conflict itself and lawyers’ roles are each varied. These
variations, and the nuanced approaches to conflict that they require of
lawyers, may themselves equip lawyers with abilities that can help them
generate and manage more productive debate.
Conflict is often thought of as necessarily bad. But conflict theorists
distinguish between constructive and destructive conflict.43 And, indeed,
38

See RANDALL KISER, SOFT SKILLS FOR THE EFFECTIVE LAWYER 96 (2017) (“Higher levels of
self-control are correlated with . . . superior conflict resolution skills.”); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT &
JEAN STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 1 (2012) (describing the skills that will help
lawyers to be better negotiators and counselors); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 359–60
(describing conflict management and consensus building skills). See also Symposium, ADR’s Place in
Navigating a Polarized Era, TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming) (considering the pros and cons of
applying alternative dispute resolution techniques to contentious issues in a polarized climate).
39
See, e.g., RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 76–90 (6th ed. 2019) (describing
active listening); Jack Zenger & Joseph Folkman, What Great Listeners Actually Do, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 14, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/what-great-listeners-actually-do (“[P]eople perceive the best
listeners to be those who periodically ask questions that promote discovery and insight. . . . Good
listeners may challenge assumptions and disagree, but the person being listened to feels the listener is
trying to help.”). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, “Open-Minded Listening”, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 139,
144 (2014) (discussing the importance of open-minded listening and the factors that hinder and
promote it).
40
Perspective taking is complicated. See, e.g., Tal Eyal et al., Perspective Mistaking: Accurately
Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking Perspective, 114 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 547, 547 (2018) (finding that perspective taking is difficult and that
accuracy about another person is better aided by engaging in conversation with them).
41
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 13, 27–37 (2012).
42
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can’t “Just All Get Along”: Dysfunction in the
Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, J. DISP. RESOL. 5, 9 (2018) (describing
the importance of focusing on interests and values in conflict resolution).
43
See LEWIS A. COSER, FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 16, 20–21, 47 (1956) (discussing both
the dysfunctional and beneficial aspects of conflict); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF
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while conflict can sometimes be devastating, it can also be “the seedbed
that nourishes social change”44 or the impetus to engage in creative
thinking about how to accommodate or reconcile legitimate, though
differing, interests. The goal, therefore, is not to eliminate disagreement or
to invariably compromise quickly. Instead, it is important to distinguish
between conflict that is necessary or useful and conflict that is unnecessary
or unproductive. A lawyer might, for example, reasonably choose to
litigate a case rather than agree to a settlement that does not meet her
clients’ interests or might pursue a strategy of litigation in the service of
legal reform. But she might also readily agree to a request for a delay in the
proceedings from opposing counsel, when doing so would not compromise
her client’s interests.
Not only is conflict itself multifaceted, but lawyers are trained to
operate in many different types of advocacy roles. In a transactional
setting, getting to an agreement with other stakeholders (while preserving
the things that are most important to one’s own client) is often the ultimate
mark of success; lawyers who are unable to ultimately facilitate
deal-making have a tough time earning a living in transactional practice
areas. To the extent that naïve realism and other confirmation biases make
it harder to appreciate—much less work to address or accommodate in
relatively low-cost ways—the interests, perspectives, and proposals of
other stakeholders in an agreement, classroom and skills training that helps
students recognize and combat such subjective blind spots can only be to
the good.
In litigation (or litigation-like) arenas, things might get even more
complicated. Even in litigation, most cases end up being settled out of
court45 and, even in cases that go to trial, there are many procedural or
substantive agreements to be made along the way.46 Litigators, therefore,
need to be dealmakers. But not all cases can or should be settled,47 and our
CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 17 (1973) (differentiating constructive and
destructive conflict).
44
DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND
SETTLEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2004).
45
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We
Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994).
Litigation is really a process of “litigotiation.” Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to
Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
46
See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 62 (2016) (describing the range of agreements made by parties throughout the
litigation process).
47
The right balance is debated. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984) (discussing problems with settlement); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:
A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2665–66
(1995) (responding to Fiss); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1117 (2009) (discussing various views and perspectives on settlements).
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adversarial process is premised on the notion of vigorous advocacy. This
means that litigators must be prepared to simultaneously cooperate and
advocate. It also means that litigators must necessarily think about other
audiences, including judges, juries, and arbitrators. To be sure, to the
extent that these neutral finders of fact (or law) lament needless
disagreement, bickering, and incivility by the participants in a
dispute-resolution process, those lawyers who are best-trained in being
reasonable—and appearing to be reasonable—will be rewarded. But there
is nothing to guarantee that deciders of cases always react negatively to
entrenched or combative presentation.48 A lawyer who has reason to know
(or even think), for example, that a particular “old-school” judge (or a
particular jury panel) will view empathy for and acknowledgement of the
plausibility of the other side’s positions as weaknesses or implicit doubts
about the validity of one’s own arguments, is duty bound by her oath to
take such information into account when framing her presentation.
Even within the roles of transactional dealmaker or litigator, the
lawyer’s role has many facets. For example, to appropriately advise their
clients as to the merits of a deal or lawsuit and the prospects for a better
deal or settlement, lawyers must be able to objectively evaluate the deal or
case. At the same time, to effectively promote clients’ interests, lawyers
must act as advocates. It is not easy to wear these two hats—neutral
observer and partisan advocate—at the same time,49 as these roles require
different skills. Similarly, lawyers “cannot steward . . . effective deal[s]
without both minimizing and facilitating risk taking.”50 As advisors,
lawyers must often simultaneously seek creative solutions for clients while
also ensuring their compliance with the law.51
48
The research literature is sparse and somewhat mixed. See Margaret S. Gibbs et al.,
Cross-Examination of the Expert Witness: Do Hostile Tactics Affect Impressions of a Simulated Jury?,
7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 280 (1989) (finding a negative effect of hostile and leading cross examination
tactics); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney
Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 548 (1996) (finding that
an aggressive presentation style was more effective than a passive style); William M. O’Barr & John
M. Conley, When a Juror Watches a Lawyer, 3 BARRISTER 8, 11 (1976) (discussing the effects of
language and presentation); Janet Sigal et al., The Effect of Presentation Style and Sex of Lawyer on
Jury Decision-Making Behavior, 22 PSYCHOLOGY 13, 16 (1985) (finding that an aggressive
presentation style was seen as more effective than a passive style). See generally Dominic A. Infante &
Andrew S. Rancer, Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggressiveness: A Review of Recent Theory and
Research, 19 ANN. INT’L COMM. ASS’N 319, 327–44 (1996) (reviewing research finding that
argumentativeness is associated with higher credibility, but verbal aggression is associated with lower
credibility). For recent research in a different context, see Popan et al., supra note 14, at 123.
49
See Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of
Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37, 43 (2010) (describing the difficulty of simultaneously
enacting multiple roles).
50
Susan P. Sturm, Lawyering Paradoxes: Making Meaning of the Contradictions 7 (Columbia
Pub. L. Research, Working Paper No. 14-642, 2019).
51
Id.
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When engaging in negotiation—whether the negotiation of a contract,
the settlement of a lawsuit, or any other negotiation—lawyers often find
themselves with multiple, and conflicting, goals. In identifying the
“Negotiator’s Dilemma,” scholars have recognized that negotiations
involve “two separate but complementary negotiation tasks—claiming or
distributing value, often described as ‘dividing the pie,’ and potentially
creating new value from the opportunities that the negotiation presents,
often described as ‘enlarging the pie.’”52 The best lawyers draw on skills—
some cooperative, some competitive—that allow them to be successful in
both of these tasks.53
All of this suggests a few possible directions for reform. First, law
schools can strive to provide (1) an even better grounding in establishing
and critically evaluating facts54 and a deeper understanding of empirical
evidence;55 (2) an understanding of the habits of mind that influence policy
debate;56 (3) more training in a wide range of approaches to dispute
resolution and the relevant toolbox of skills;57 (4) facility in navigating the
multiplicity of roles and making the nuanced distinctions required of

52
RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 149–66. See also DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–45 (1986) (“There is a central, inescapable tension between cooperative
moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage.”). See Keith G.
Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework for Managing the Dilemma Between
Claiming and Creating Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387 (2000) (discussing best practices and strategies to
manage this tension).
53
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147–49 (2002); Tinsley et al., supra
note 33, at 621–22, 624, 637.
54
See Beryl Blaustone & Lisa Radtke Bliss, The Role of the Lawyer and the Essential Skills to
Teach Law Students in an Era of Fake News, “Alternative Facts,” and Governing by Disruption, 19
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 139, 154–55 (2018) (discussing lawyers’ role in investigating, identifying, and
establishing facts; challenging assumptions; looking behind alleged facts; and thinking about
permissible inferences). Also important is the ability to distinguish the less than helpful concepts of
“alternative facts” or “nonexistent truth” from the more useful notion of “constructive ambiguity” in
dispute resolution. Noam Ebner, Begun, The Trust War Has: Teaching Negotiation When Truth Isn’t
Truth, 35 NEGOT. J. 207, 208 (2019).
55
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 1–2 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining
the importance for lawyers of understanding research design and statistics).
56
See, e.g., JOHN COOK & STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY, THE DEBUNKING HANDBOOK 1 (2011)
(examining how attempts to debunk myths can reinforce those myths); ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT,
supra note 38, at 1 (describing psychological phenomena that influence conflict and its resolution); Jiin
Jung et al., A Multidisciplinary Understanding of Polarization, 74 AM. PSYCHOL. 301, 307–10 (2019)
(discussing a multidisciplinary approach to understanding polarization); Sami R. Yousif et al., The
Illusion of Consensus: A Failure to Distinguish Between True and False Consensus, 30 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1195, 1195 (2019) (discussing how false consensus can influence what information we trust); supra
notes 5–18 and accompanying text (discussing how preferences and prior beliefs can lead to biases
when evaluating arguments).
57
See generally RISKIN ET AL., supra note 39 (surveying a range of skills and approaches relevant
to dispute resolution).
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lawyers; and (5) a foundation of essential skills for making good
decisions and working effectively with other people, including
adversaries. 59
Second, at the very least, a lawyer who is trained in civil advocacy
could present to her client the choice between a no-holds barred approach
that might yield a somewhat better financial outcome and a more
enlightened strategy that may leave the client with a bit less money in her
pocket but serve other interests the client may have, leaving her feeling
better about herself, the opposing party (with whom the client may have an
ongoing business or personal relationship), and the legal system in
general.60 Even more broadly, lawyers can work to distinguish the
professional and the personal, to distinguish necessary and unnecessary
conflict, to distinguish instances in which litigation is necessary from those
in which a consensual solution is attainable, to distinguish their roles of
advocate and advisor, and to distinguish the ways in which they present
arguments to different audiences.61 Educating clients and opponents about
these nuances can open the door to more problem-solving and less needless
conflict.
Third, law schools should—in the short and long term—look to
educate would-be decision makers (current and future judges and the
citizenry at large) about how the adversarial system can generate the most
accurate and fair results in individual cases and for society at large.62 Just
58

See Sturm, supra note 50, at 5 (discussing the importance of “making sense of, and being able
to forge constructive tension between [the] oppositional aspects of lawyering”).
59
See KISER, supra note 38, at 4–5, 9–11 (describing the increasing importance of intrapersonal
and personal competencies to the success of lawyers and other professionals); ROBBENNOLT &
STERNLIGHT, supra note 38, at 5 (noting the most important skills for lawyers); John M. Lande & Jean
R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law
Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247, 251 (2010) (highlighting the
importance for lawyers of understanding emotion, communication skills, and creativity); Jean R.
Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal
Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 365–73 (2015) (discussing the connection between psychology and
the core competencies of working with other people and making good decisions).
60
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
61
Sturm, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that these sorts of tensions “lie at the heart of what makes
lawyers distinctive, necessary, and effective. The most successful and impactful lawyers live in these
tensions. This capacity to hold paradox may be what equips lawyers to exercise truly effective
leadership”); Symposium, ADR’s Place in Navigating a Polarized Era, supra note 38 (considering
“whether and how we can teach our students to be discerning in making appropriate use of these
approaches and skills, both in their future representation of clients and in their future roles as leaders
within their local, professional, religious, and political communities”).
62
The preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct notes that “a lawyer should further
the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). See Justin Sevier, A
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as with democracy, there is no guarantee that America’s distinctive
contribution to formal dispute resolution (an adversarial system with robust
lawyer ethical obligations and information protection, combined with
mechanisms to help all kinds of clients secure competent and zealous
representation) will be maintained in the next century as it has over the last
two. We are at an historical moment in which sharp disagreements and
seeming inability to appreciate the other side’s points is causing policy
leaders in Washington and on the campaign trail to threaten major reform
of the country’s highest legal institutions, so nothing can or should be
taken for granted.
At the same time, we are not suggesting a world in which lawyers are
trained to facilitate consensual resolution of all controversies. Indeed, one
increasingly prominent critique of the nation’s dispute-resolution system is
that certain kinds of cases are settled too frequently, such that institutions
that represent the public, like appellate courts and legislatures, are starved
of fodder to reflect on and weigh in on major policy issues that should,
because of their external and symbolic effects, not be left entirely to
private ordering.63 But even here, disputes that are best resolved by our
government leaders among the three branches can be clarified, streamlined,
and facilitated—not hindered—when lawyers better understand how to
present arguments in a less histrionic and more balanced and data-informed
way. Our adversarial system is most worth preserving when we keep
firmly in mind that adversarial is not the same thing as belligerent, and
certainly not the same thing as bellicose.

[Relational] Theory of Procedure, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1987, 1996–98 (2020) (describing establishing
truth and providing justice as key objectives of dispute resolution). For empirical work on how U.S.
laypeople view adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Justin Sevier, The Trust-Justice Tradeoff:
Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal
Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212, 213 (2014).
63
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 47, at 1075 (describing the potential costs of settlement); MenkelMeadow, supra note 47, at 2663–67 (discussing “when, how, and under what circumstances” disputes
should be settled); Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, supra note 47
(presenting a range of views on settlement).

